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1057 
CLOSING THE FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
LOOPHOLE: DEFINING “ACCESS” IN THE 
RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a hole in Fourth Amendment protection that is teetering on the 
verge of rapid expansion. The omnipresence of technology in the 21st 
century has made the use of intermediaries necessary for fully participating 
in society. From sending messages through Facebook to driving past 
cellular phone towers, many everyday activities involve sharing information 
about ourselves with the third parties who give us access to new technology. 
The scope of privacy law, however, has not advanced at a similar pace. In 
the 1976 case United States v. Miller,1 the Supreme Court punctured the 
Fourth Amendment privacy protections set forth in Katz v. United States.2 
In Katz, the Court had extended protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures to areas in which a person has a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”3 Nine years later in Miller, the Court decided that there is no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information handed over to third parties 
(in that case, a bank).4 The Court asserted that “the Fourth Amendment does 
not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities.”5 Smith v. Maryland widened 
this gap in Fourth Amendment protection to include communication 
information.6 The Court stated that there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in numbers dialed into phones, since the dialer is aware that the 
“phone company has facilities for recording this information” and that it 
does, in fact, record it.7  
Miller and Smith have come to stand for the legal theory of the “third 
party doctrine.” Professor Daniel Solove, a leading expert on privacy law, 
summarized the theory: 
This doctrine provides that if information is possessed or known by 
third parties, then, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an 
individual lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
 
 
 1. 425 U.S. 435 (1976), superseded by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (2012), as recognized in SEC v. 
Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984).  
 2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
 3. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 4. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.  
 5. Id. at 443.  
 6. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).   
 7. Id. at 743.  
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information. In the Information Age, much of what we do is recorded 
by third parties. The third-party doctrine therefore places an extensive 
amount of personal information outside the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.8 
Since this information lies outside the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection, the showing that the government must make to access a citizen’s 
personal information from a trusted third party is an open question.  
Most of the academic commentary on third-party doctrine has focused 
only on communications privacy.9 This is surprising because the Court 
originally formulated the third-party exception from Fourth Amendment 
protection in the context of an individual’s financial records held by a 
bank.10 In the age of the data breach, financial privacy and security are as 
important as communications privacy. One reason for the scholarly 
avoidance of the financial privacy issue could be that Congress, alarmed by 
the Court’s finding in Miller, passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act11 
(“RFPA”) to remedy the hole in Fourth Amendment protection left by 
Miller.12 
Today, however, the privacy of financial records from unwarranted 
government intrusion is under siege. First, financial records are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.13 Second, a case making its way 
through the federal judiciary is asserting a cramped interpretation of the 
RFPA, which, if adopted by the majority of circuits, would create a loophole 
allowing banks to release customer information into the public record.14 
Third, in deciding Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court left open the 
 
 
 8. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528–29 (2006) (footnotes 
omitted).  
 9. See, e.g., Monu Bedi, Facebook and Interpersonal Privacy: Why the Third Party Doctrine 
Should Not Apply, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2013); Tim Sheehan, Taking the Third-Party Doctrine Too Far: 
Why Cell Phone Tracking Data Deserves Fourth Amendment Protection, 13 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
181 (2015); Glenn Greenwald, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/S4MP-ZWSK].  
 10. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), superseded by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 
(2012), as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984).  
 11. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422.  
 12. Richard Cordero, Annotation, Construction and Application of Right to Financial Privacy Act 
of 1978 (12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3401 et seq.), 112 A.L.R. Fed. 295, § 2[a] (1993) (stating that Congress passed 
the RFPA because of their concern that, post-Miller, the privacy rights of taxpayers were at risk).  
 13. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.  
 14. See Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 
2015 WL 5177737, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015), aff’d, 645 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2016). See also 
Brief for Appellants at 1–2, Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 645 F. App’x 
428 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2015) (No. 15-6092) [hereinafter Brackfield Brief for Appellants].  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/10
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possibility of lower courts deciding that statutory violations are not injuries 
at all—an outcome that would strip a customer of his ability to sue under 
the RFPA if a bank releases his information.15 Thus, despite Congress’s 
attempt to safeguard financial records from unwarranted government 
intrusion, the financial privacy of Americans is being threatened in multiple 
levels of the judiciary. 
The problem culminating from these attacks is the weakening of 
financial privacy protection for records in the hands of trusted third parties. 
The solution is this: the Supreme Court’s reversal of Miller. The Supreme 
Court created a hole in Fourth Amendment protection in its Miller opinion 
and the remedy offered by Congress is now under siege because of the open-
ended Spokeo decision and the judiciary’s cramped interpretation of the 
RFPA.16 Now, it is up to the Supreme Court to reverse Miller and stop the 
erosion of financial privacy. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the Miller decision and the hole it left in 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection of financial information left in the 
hands of trusted third parties. Part II will discuss Congress’s response to 
Miller in the RFPA. Part III will discuss the cramped interpretation of the 
RFPA affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, its misapplication of the statute, and 
policy problems arising from the acceptance of the court’s interpretation. 
Part IV will discuss statutory injuries and how the ambiguous outcome of 
the Spokeo case could threaten financial privacy protections generally and 
those specifically provided by the RFPA. Part V will discuss the proposed 
solution to the problem 
I. FINANCIAL PRIVACY AND THE MILLER DECISION 
A flurry of privacy laws, especially those related to safeguarding 
financial information, were enacted in the 1970s in response to the general 
distrust of government after the Vietnam War and the growing cache of 
customer records being stored on computers.17 This sense of unease was 
exacerbated when the Supreme Court upheld the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 
which required banks to maintain financial records of customers so the 
federal government would be able to “enforce the myriad criminal, tax, and 
 
 
 15. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  
 16. For an example of a cramped interpretation of the RFPA, see Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, 
at *1.  
 17. MARK FURLETTI & STEPHEN SMITH, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., FINANCIAL PRIVACY: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PAYMENT CARDS INDUSTRY 2 (2003) (noting that “the development of 
mainframe computers…made the accumulation and storage of detailed information regarding millions 
of individuals technically feasible”).  
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regulatory provisions of laws”—a function that had been impaired by 
shoddy recordkeeping.18 An important limitation on these required records, 
however, was that they would “not be made automatically available for law 
enforcement purposes [but could] only be obtained through existing legal 
process.”19 To address growing concerns about how new technologies could 
lead to widespread data collection, Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 
1974.20 The purpose of the Privacy Act was “to promote governmental 
respect for the privacy of citizens” by increasing accountability and 
legislative oversight with respect to the use of personal information 
collected by the government.21 The Act’s purpose of increasing customer 
privacy was thwarted by the 1976 decision in United States v. Miller.22  
Two weeks after deputies in Houston County, Georgia found a “7,500-
gallon-capacity distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax-paid whiskey, and related 
paraphernalia” on his property, Mitchell Miller was charged with conspiring 
to defraud the government of tax revenues.23 Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms agents found evidence of Miller’s untaxed income by issuing 
subpoenas to the presidents of Miller’s bank, requesting his financial 
records.24 Copies of Miller’s checks obtained from his bank were used as 
evidence in his trial and he was ultimately convicted.25 The Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, found that the subpoenas were 
defective and reversed the admission of the checks, finding that their 
admittance would violate his Fourth Amendment rights.26 The Supreme 
Court reversed, reasoning that the financial records of Miller were outside 
his “zone of privacy” as they were not his private papers but were instead 
business records owned by the bank.27 With this reasoning, the third-party 
 
 
 18. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). See also Sarah Elizabeth Jones & Sandra 
Tvarian, A Review of Government Use & Customer Challenges Under the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act Since 1978, 1996-AUG NAAG FIN. CRIMES REP. 1, 1 (1996).  
 19. Cal. Bankers Ass’n, 416 U.S. at 27 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 91-975, at 10 (1970)).  
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).  
 21. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6916. Other stated 
purposes include preventing the secret gathering of information about people, preventing illegal 
surveillance of citizens, and to promote observance of the principle of individual privacy. Id., as 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6916–17.  
 22. See infra notes 23–32 and accompanying text.  
 23. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 436–37 (1976), superseded by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 
(2012), as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984). 
 24. Miller, 425 U.S. at 437.  
 25. Id. at 438.  
 26. Id. at 437 (The subpoenas were issued by a United States Attorney instead of a judge.).  
 27. Id. at 440. If the agents had tried to execute the warrant on Miller himself, the evidence from 
the search would not have stood up in court because the warrant was defective. Id. at 441. See also 
Joseph R. Mangan, Jr., Comment, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Bank Records: A Reappraisal 
of United States v. Miller and Bank Depositor Privacy Rights, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/10
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doctrine was created. Justice Powell, delivering the opinion of the Court, 
wrote:  
The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that 
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government. 
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not 
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and 
conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .28  
Concerned about the Miller decision’s implication that the Internal Revenue 
Service could ask for any (or every) citizen’s records without recourse, 
Congress began crafting the RFPA.29 In a House Report on the Financial 
Institutions Regulatory Act of 1978,30 Congress stated, “[W]hile the 
Supreme Court found no constitutional right of privacy in financial records, 
it is clear that Congress may provide protection of individual rights beyond 
that afforded in the Constitution.”31 Thus, Congress enacted the RFPA to 
“strike a balance between customers’ right of privacy and the need for law 
enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate 
investigations.”32 
II. A RESPONSE TO MILLER: THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT 
The RFPA provides two layers of protection for bank customers’ 
privacy.33 The first layer forbids the government from obtaining customer 
information without following a set protocol.34 In order to provide citizens 
 
 
n.15 (1981).  
 28. Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted). In making this decision, the Court relied on the 
assertion in Katz that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Id. at 442 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).  
 29. See Cordero, supra note 12.  
 30. The RFPA was introduced as Title XI of this Act. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 6 (1978), as 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9278.  
 31. Id. at 34, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9306.  
 32. Id. at 33, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9305.  
 33. The RFPA defines a “person” as “an individual or a partnership of five or fewer individuals,” 
12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2012), and a “customer” as “any person or authorized representative of that person 
who utilized or is utilizing any service of a financial institution, or for whom a financial institution is 
acting or has acted as a fiduciary, in relation to an account maintained in the person’s name.” Id. § 
3401(5). For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the plaintiff in an RFPA action as a customer, i.e., an 
individual with a bank account. Further, the RFPA defines a “financial institution” as “any office of a 
bank, savings bank, card issuer . . . , industrial loan company, trust company, savings association, 
building and loan, or homestead association (including cooperative banks), credit union, or consumer 
finance institution,” located in the United States or its territories. Id. § 3401(1). I will use “financial 
institution” or “bank” to mean financial institution within the RFPA.  
 34. Id. § 3402.  
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with a blanket of privacy, the RFPA states that, limited exceptions aside,35 
“no Government authority may have access to or obtain copies of, or the 
information contained in the financial records of any customer from a 
financial institution” unless such records are “reasonably described” and 
either the customer has authorized the disclosure, or such records are 
disclosed pursuant to a legitimate legal process, as listed in the statute.36 The 
RFPA further reinforces the protection of customer privacy within the 
government by limiting interagency transfers of the information.37 In the 
House Report describing this section of the RFPA, the writers explain, “This 
section provides that information obtained under the title may not be used 
or retained for any purpose other than the specific statutory purpose for 
which the information was originally obtained, and that the information may 
not be transferred to another government agency without specific statutory 
authorization.”38 Thus, once a government agency obtains a customer’s 
information, it is not only prohibited from sharing such information with 
other branches, but also limited to how the information is used even within 
that agency. 
While § 3402 provides protection by preventing the customer’s 
information from being obtained by government authorities, § 3403 
provides protection by preventing the customer’s information from being 
released by their financial institution.39 § 3403, titled “Confidentiality of 
financial records,” states, “No financial institution . . . may provide to any 
Government authority access to or copies of, or the information contained 
 
 
 35. Id. Under the statute, a financial institution may release customer information if that 
information “may be relevant to a possible violation of any statute or regulation.” Id. § 3403(c). Even 
then, the only information allowed to be disclosed is the customer’s name (or the account involved) and 
the nature of the suspected legal activity. Id. A bank can also release customer records “as an incident 
to perfecting a security interest, proving a claim in bankruptcy, or otherwise collecting on a debt.” Id. § 
3403(d)(1). Finally, a government authority can legally obtain customer information without adhering 
to the safeguards of the RFPA for certain intelligence and protective purposes or in emergency situations 
(i.e., if delay in access “would create imminent danger of— (A) physical injury to any person; (B) serious 
property damage; or (C) flight to avoid prosecution.”). Id. § 3414(b)(1).  
 36. Id. § 3402. Financial records may be released without violating the statute when the records 
are reasonably described and disclosed in response to an administrative subpoena or summons, a search 
warrant, a judicial subpoena, or a formal written request—a last resort when all the other options, 
including attempts to notify the customer, have failed. Id. §§ 3402(2)–(5).  
 37. Id. § 3412(a) (“Financial records originally obtained pursuant to this chapter shall not be 
transferred to another agency or department unless the transferring agency or department certifies in 
writing that there is reason to believe that the records are relevant to a legitimate law enforcement inquiry 
. . . .”). § 3412(a) also allows for interagency transfers when “there is reason to believe that the records 
are relevant to . . . intelligence or counterintelligence activity, investigation or analysis related to 
international terrorism within the jurisdiction of the receiving agency or department.” Id. 
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 35 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9307.  
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 3403 (2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/10
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in, the financial records of any customer except in accordance with the 
[RFPA].”40 Further, the section prohibits a financial institution from 
releasing the information “until the Government authority seeking such 
records certifies in writing to the financial institution that it has complied 
with the applicable provisions of this chapter.”41 The latter component 
seems to be forbidding a financial institution from voluntarily releasing 
customer information, as discussed infra Part III–C(2). 
Finally, the RFPA prescribes liability in § 3417, stating that any 
government agent or financial institution obtaining or disclosing financial 
records about a customer in violation of the RFPA is liable to the customer 
for $100 “without regard to the volume of records involved”, actual and 
punitive damages (if applicable), and, if the customer is successful in her 
claim, attorney’s fees.42  
III. BRACKFIELD’S CRAMPING OF THE RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT 
Though the RFPA appears relatively straightforward in its application, 
like much of the law, it contains some room for ambiguity. The RFPA 
prohibits financial institutions from granting the federal government 
“access to” customer information.43 But, since its passage in 1978, there has 
been almost no case law interpreting one of the key phrases in the statute: 
“access to.” 44 A decision on the scope of the words “access to” could mean 
the difference between the RFPA allowing banks to publish customer 
information freely, so long as there is no government authority waiting to 
accept it, and prohibiting a bank from releasing the information at all unless 
certain conditions are met.45 On September 4, 2015, the District Court in the 
Eastern District of Tennessee ruled that the RFPA had not been violated 
 
 
 40. Id. § 3403(a).  
 41. Id. § 3403(b). 
 42. Id. § 3417(a).  
 43. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 44. This author was unable to find an interpretation of the phrase “access to” in any case law or 
legislative history of the RFPA. In their appeal, the Brackfield plaintiffs note this fact with a level of 
incredulity in their statement to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:  
The instant appeal presents this Court with a surprising apparent issue of first impression with 
respect to the interpretation of the RFPA. Notwithstanding that the RFPA has been law for 
several decades, it appears that there has been no judicial construction of one of the central 
provisions of this banking privacy law which affords a private right of action to those who can 
show a single violation . . . . Plaintiffs are unaware of any trial or appellate court in the United 
States, state or federal, addressing Plaintiffs’ common-sense interpretations of the RFPA.  
Brackfield Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 1–2.  
 45. For a list of exceptions to this outcome, as set out in the RFPA, see 12 U.S.C. § 3402, discussed 
supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
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when the financial institution Branch Banking & Trust (BB&T) released a 
customer’s financial information into the public record.46 The court’s 
interpretation of the RFPA’s reach was affirmed in an unpublished opinion 
by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.47 In deciding that a bank may 
publish customer information without violating the RFPA, Brackfield & 
Associates P’ship v. BB&T Co. exemplifies the gaps in the current body of 
privacy law created by the third party doctrine despite the increasingly 
prominent concern about keeping personal information private in a post-
Snowden48 world.49  
Although the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Brackfield is not binding 
authority, its narrow interpretation of the RFPA, if accepted by lower courts 
and other circuits, would significantly reduce the privacy protections 
Americans have over their financial records.50 This is of even greater 
importance in a time when people are more concerned than ever about 
protecting the privacy of their personal information.51 Additionally, 
although this decision is not binding on other circuits, its holding will likely 
have a disproportionate impact on the judiciary’s treatment of the RFPA 
going forward since there are no cases interpreting the phrase “access to” in 
 
 
 46. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015), aff’d, 645 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2016). While RFPA 
generally prohibits banks from releasing an individual’s private information, there is an exception 
allowing public disclosure in order to perfect the financial institution’s interest in that customer’s 
property. See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(d). Here, there was no claim that the information was disclosed to perfect 
BB&T’s interest, so this case is particularly illustrative of the problem of interpreting the RFPA 
narrowly, where it only prohibits the release of customer information to the public when there is a 
government agency waiting to receive it. See discussion infra Part III-C.  
 47. Brackfield, 645 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 48. Edward Snowden, “the individual responsible for one of the most significant leaks in US 
political history[,]” revealed the mass surveillance of American citizens being conducted by the National 
Security Agency in the summer of 2013. Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: the whistleblower 
behind the NSA surveillance revelations, THE GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013, 9:00 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance 
[https://perma.cc/AKU3-EXAU].  
 49. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CAL. 
L. REV. 1887, 1889 (2010) (“Today, the chorus of opinion is that the tort law of privacy has been 
ineffective, particularly in remedying the burgeoning collection, use, and dissemination of personal 
information in the Information Age.”).  
 50. America has “a patchwork of federal and state privacy laws that separately govern the use of 
personal details in spheres like patient billing, motor vehicle records, education and video rental 
records.” Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-an-incomplete-american-quilt.html. 
Alternatively, the European Union has blanket data protection that sets guidelines for how citizen 
information may be collected and used, no matter the industry. Id. Thus, when an American privacy 
statute is deemed ineffective by the courts, privacy protection for Americans is reduced significantly for 
that area or sector.  
 51. See Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY? 33 (Austin Sarat 
ed., 2015).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/10
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the RFPA.52  
In a broader sense, the Brackfield decision is important because 
information privacy law is a relatively new area of jurisprudence and, 
because of that, “privacy doctrines in one area are being used to inform and 
structure legal responses in other areas.”53 Because of this potential for later 
courts to give more weight than is warranted to earlier decisions in emerging 
areas of law, it is important for today’s courts to consider the ease with 
which information can be disseminated when interpreting privacy 
statutes—especially those courts which are the first to declare a statute’s 
meaning. Even in the much-maligned Miller case, Justice Brennan’s dissent 
recognized the need for the law to take account of changes in access to 
information, stating: 
Development of photocopying machines, electronic computers and 
other sophisticated instruments have accelerated the ability of 
government to intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to 
exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently, 
judicial interpretations of the reach of the constitutional protection of 
individual privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these 
new devices.54  
Since the mid-seventies, information collection and dissemination has 
become even more commonplace as the Internet has become a part of our 
daily lives. However, the Brackfield judgment reveals that even the 
ambiguities in old laws are still being interpreted as limiting privacy 
protections against the spread of personal information.  
Part III will focus on analyzing “access to” in the phrase “[n]o financial 
institution . . . may provide to any Government authority access to or copies 
of, or the information contained in, the financial records of any customer” 
in § 3403.55 This Part of the Note looks to answer the questions: Does 
releasing a customer’s information into the public record constitute 
providing a government authority “access to” that information? Or is a more 
direct link required between the financial institution releasing the 
information and a government authority accessing it? To answer that 
question, this Note analyzes the meaning of the RFPA’s phrase “access to” 
 
 
 52. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 53. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, CONSUMER PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION 2 
(2015).  
 54. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451–52 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590, 596 (Cal. 1974)).  
 55. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (2012).  
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in light of the applicable canons of interpretation, existing case law 
interpreting the RFPA, and the legislative history preceding the act, 
concluding with a recommended interpretation considering the need for 
modern privacy laws. The author recommends interpreting the RFPA as 
prohibiting financial institutions from granting a government authority 
access to a customer’s financial information by releasing such information 
into the public record when such an action falls outside the listed exceptions. 
The RFPA grants customers a cause of action against either, or both, of two 
entities in violation of the statute: a financial institution and a government 
authority.56 This separation of entities against which claims can be brought 
protects customer information in two ways. It allows aggrieved customers 
whose financial information has been improperly disclosed a right of action 
against (1) the governmental authority that obtained the records,57 and (2) 
the financial institution58 that disclosed them.59 
A. The Brackfield Facts 
To analyze how the Brackfield court misapplied the RFPA, as well as 
how the phrase “access to” functions in the RFPA, it is first necessary to lay 
out the facts from Brackfield.60 Brackfield & Associated Partnership and 
Eugene Brackfield (the general partner) were customers of BB&T.61 In the 
course of their relationship, BB&T issued the plaintiffs (collectively 
“Brackfield”) an open line of credit on the condition that Brackfield 
routinely provide BB&T with detailed financial information about the 
company, including a spreadsheet of its assets and liabilities.62 BB&T and 
 
 
 56. Compare id. § 3402 (prohibiting access to financial records by government authorities), with 
id. § 3403 (prohibiting financial institutions from providing “access to or copies of, or the information 
contained in, the financial records of” customers).  
 57. See id. § 3402.  
 58. See id. § 3403.  
 59. Discussed further infra Part III-C(2). See also Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 
1996) (“Examination of the Right to Financial Privacy Act indicates that Congress there recognized a 
distinction between limiting disclosure of information and limiting access to information.”); Lopez v. 
First Union Nat’l Bank of Florida, 129 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Among other things, the 
RFPA defines the conditions in which financial institutions may disclose an individual’s financial 
records, defines the conditions in which government officials may access an individual’s financial 
records, and provides a civil cause of action for anyone injured by a violation of the act’s substantive 
provisions.”) (citations omitted).  
 60. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015). 
 61. Id. at *1. 
 62. Id. The company is a partnership of five or fewer people so it qualifies as a “person” within 
the meaning of the RFPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2012) (defining a person as “an individual or a 
partnership of five or fewer individuals”).  
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Brackfield contractually agreed that no real property assets would serve as 
collateral on the loan.63 Weeks after this agreement, BB&T filed a UCC 
financing statement with the Tennessee Secretary of State,64 which need 
only contain the debtor’s and creditor’s name and address, and a general 
indication of the collateral property.65 BB&T, however, included a complete 
listing of the assets and liabilities of the company and filed it (along with 
the UCC) with the Secretary of State, as well as the Register of Deeds66—
neither of which constitute a “government authority” for the purposes of § 
3401(3) since these are employees of the state and the RFPA only refers to 
federal agents.67 After these filings, the UCC and its attached financial 
documents become part of the public record “to which the entire world, 
including any and all government agencies or authorities, had free and open 
access.”68 Since Brackfield’s property was contractually excluded as 
collateral, the bank’s recording of the UCC did not perfect a security interest 
in the property.69 Additionally, even if it would have perfected such an 
interest, the inclusion of the company’s un-redacted financial information 
offered no greater security than filing the UCC without that information 
would have offered.70  
The injuries flowing from a bank publishing a customer’s financial 
information are difficult to trace since such injuries deal more with a 
business’s reputation than immediate losses. For example, a commercially 
reasonable title insurer would not insure property over which the lender 
appears to claim a security interest, a commercially reasonable buyer would 
not purchase property without title insurance, and a commercially 
 
 
 63. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *1. 
 64. Id. Lenders file Uniform Commercial Code-1 (UCC) financing statements with the state to 
announce that the lender has or may have an interest in the debtor’s personal property. UCC Financing 
Statement, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ucc_financing_ 
statement. 
 65. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *1. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See 12 U.S.C. § 3401(3) (2012).  
 68. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *1 (as asserted by Brackfield). 
 69. Such an act would be allowed under the RFPA. See 12 U.S.C. § 3403(c) (2012).  
 70. See U.C.C. § 9-502 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (listing the requirements for 
a UCC filing). In addition to the first UCC filing, BB&T filed an amended version of the same 
information again in 2013. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *2. The second filing occurred after 
Brackfield discovered that BB&T “purported to encumber assets beyond those to which the parties 
agreed,” and Brackfield notified BB&T of the incorrect information. Id. at *2. The second UCC filing, 
although amended, still “contained unredacted financial records not incident to the perfection of a 
security interest in any of the real property described therein.” Id. Brackfield claimed that each of these 
filings amounted to an RFPA violation and entitled them to the $100 statutory damages. Complaint at 
¶¶ 49, 85–86, Brackfield & Associates P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-
HBG, 2015 WL 5177737 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Brackfield Complaint].  
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reasonable lender requiring a first priority lien against a property would not 
accept that property as collateral.71 Thus, Brackfield would conceivably 
suffer the damages of receiving less favorable loan rates because of the 
apparent interest in the property, as well as the reputation losses associated 
with the release of sensitive financial information about himself and his 
company. These damages would accumulate even without consideration of 
the potential breach of Brackfield’s financial privacy, which creates an even 
more nebulous injury.  
Ultimately, the court granted BB&T’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under the RFPA.72 It reasoned that since BB&T did not disclose 
Brackfield’s information directly to a government authority (instead putting 
it into the public record, where a government authority can later obtain it), 
the customers had no claim.73 The court later provided that for Brackfield 
to succeed in this claim, they “need only establish that their information was 
obtained by the Government.”74 The next sections of this Note will explain 
how the court misapplied the RFPA by overlooking the “access to” 
provision of the statute altogether, and by requiring government obtainment 
for a successful RFPA claim against a financial institution. 
B. How Brackfield Misapplied the Right to Financial Privacy Act: 
Defining “Access to” 
No appellate court has interpreted the meaning of the RFPA’s statutory 
phrase “access to.”75 To understand the meaning and scope of the phrase, it 
is first necessary to look at the RFPA’s plain text, and then analyze the 
phrase using established canons of statutory construction. Remedial 
legislation should be broadly construed, every word of a statute is to be 
given effect, the term “or” is to be interpreted as disjunctive, and the 
inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of others (expressio unius).76  
 
 
 71. These injuries were among those listed in the Brackfield complaint. Brackfield Complaint, 
supra note 70, at ¶¶ 96–99. Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the interests in privacy 
fade when the information involved already appears on the public record.” Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 
420 U.S. 469, 494–95 (1975). Thus, a customer’s information, once on the public record, could be widely 
circulated—intensifying the injuries.  
 72. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *3.  
 73. Id. at *2–3. 
 74. Id. at *3. 
 75. See Brackfield Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 1–2. See also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text.  
 76. Canons are helpful tools for judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutes. 2A NORMAN J. 
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:13 
(7th ed. 2008). However, “[a] rule of construction [is] only an aid to fulfilling the legislature’s intent; as 
such it [is] always rebuttable by more specific matter from the statutory text or from legislative history.” 
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Black’s Law Dictionary defines “access” as “[a] right, opportunity, or 
ability to enter.”77 Generally, courts assume that the words in a statute take 
on their ordinary meaning, or, in other words, how an ordinary or reasonable 
person would understand them.78 In the RFPA, following the ordinary 
meaning of the word “access,” the government does have access to customer 
financial information released into the public record. Specifically, when a 
bank releases a customer’s information into the public record,79 to which 
government agents have access (as members of the public), they have the 
opportunity to enter the public record and access the files therein. The 
question now becomes whether this generalized access is the type of access 
contemplated by the RFPA. When a statute is ambiguous, the interpreter is 
not restricted to the plain language of the text and may look beyond the 
language into that statute’s legislative history to search for legislative 
intent.80 
To uncover the phrase’s intended meaning, it is helpful to analyze the 
context within which the RFPA was enacted. The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Miller, which prompted lawmakers to pass the RFPA, resulted in giving 
law enforcement agencies unfettered access to financial records as long as 
they obtained the records from the bank and not the customer herself. 81 
Because Congress passed the RFPA as remedial legislation (i.e., a statute 
designed to provide a remedy “for the enforcement of rights and the redress 
of injuries”)82 in response to Miller, it should be “construed broadly to 
effectuate its purposes.”83 The legislative history leading up to the RFPA’s 
 
 
JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 56–57 (1982). 
 77. Access, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015) (defining “access” as “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of 
something”).  
 78. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES 
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 819–20 (3d. ed. 2001); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2008) (noting the 
plain meaning rule and Supreme Court’s insight that “the meaning of the statute must, in the first 
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, … the sole function 
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”). 
 79. That is to say, the customer’s information was put into the public record without perfecting 
any legitimate interest in the property (which is a listed exclusion to RFPA violations). See 12 U.S.C. § 
3403(d) (2012).  
 80. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 2008). 
 81. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) superseded by statute, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 
(2012), as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984).  
 82. 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 60:2 (7th ed. 2008).  
 83. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (“[W]e are guided by the familiar canon 
of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to effectuate its 
purposes.”).  
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enactment states its purpose as “strik[ing] a balance between customers’ 
right of privacy and the need of law enforcement agencies to obtain financial 
records pursuant to legitimate investigations.”84 It follows that the RFPA’s 
purpose was to give customers a legitimate expectation of privacy that the 
Miller Court found they do not constitutionally have. A broadly construed 
interpretation of the RFPA would err toward protecting a customer’s 
privacy when ambiguities between the rights of the banks and the rights of 
its customers arise, as seen in Brackfield.  
Another canon that serves to clarify the phrase “access to” is “the 
elementary principle that requires an interpreter ‘to give effect, if possible, 
to every clause and word of a statute.’”85 Through this lens, instead of 
reading § 3403(a) as prohibiting financial institutions from providing “any 
Government authority access to or copies of, or the information contained 
in, the financial records of any customer[,]”86 it would be read to prohibit 
the bank from performing three discrete kinds of acts: providing access to 
the records, providing copies of the records, or providing the information 
contained within the records.87 The latter reading logically follows from the 
principle of interpretation that “[d]ifferent words used in the same . . . statute 
are assigned different meanings whenever possible.”88  
The statute’s use of the disjunctive term “or” further supports the 
interpretation that “access to” has an independent meaning and is not simply 
a repetitive reinforcement of “copies of.” In referring to the word “or,” the 
Supreme Court explained that the term’s “ordinary use is almost always 
disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to ‘be given separate 
meanings.’”89 By this understanding, any one of the three actions (providing 
access to, copies of, or information contained in the customer’s records) is 
 
 
 84. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305.  
 85. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2498 (2015) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 
152 (1883)). The Supreme Court has pointed out, however, that “[l]awmakers sometimes repeat 
themselves” perhaps because of their “lawyerly penchant for doublets (aid and abet, cease and desist, 
null and void).” Id. But here, where reading the language as duplicative would render “access to” as 
completely meaningless, this canon is rightly employed. After all, “[l]awmakers do not . . . tend to use 
terms that ‘have no operation at all.’” Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 
(1803)). 
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a) (2012).  
 87. Brief of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 6, Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch 
Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-00524-PLR-HBG, 2015 WL 5177737 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015) 
[hereinafter Brackfield Response to Motion to Dismiss].  
 88. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2008). 
 89. United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 (2013) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 
U.S. 330, 339 (1979)). 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21:14 (7th ed. 2008) (“Generally, courts presume that “or” is used in a 
statute disjunctively unless there is clear legislative intent to the contrary.”) (footnote omitted). 
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sufficient by itself to trigger a violation of the RFPA. This expansiveness 
shows Congress’ attempt to broadly protect customer information from 
unwarranted government intrusion.90  
Finally, even if one is not inclined to interpret the phrase “access to” as 
a distinct and separate violation, the expressio unius maxim, which is the 
understanding that the inclusion of some things implies the exclusion of 
others, would render BB&T’s actions in Brackfield an RFPA violation.91 
The RFPA lists exceptions to liability when, among other things, there is a 
possible threat to national security, the bank has a good faith belief that a 
customer is engaging in illegal activity, or the bank is pursuing a legitimate 
lien or other claim on the customer’s property.92 Since there are exceptions 
specifically promulgated by the RFPA, a logical assumption is that if the 
bank’s action is not on that list, then its actions are punishable under the 
RFPA.93 
C. How Brackfield Misapplied the Right to Financial Privacy Act: 
 
 
 90. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305 (“[The 
RFPA] is intended to protect the customers of financial institutions from unwarranted intrusion into their 
records while at the same time permitting legitimate law enforcement activity.”).  
 91. This interpretive tool is listed last intentionally because it does not enjoy the same legal footing 
as the previously listed canons. “The expressio unius maxim receives wide legal application, yet there 
is nothing peculiarly legal about it. Instead, the maxim is a product of ‘logic and common sense,’ and 
derives from the general understanding and experience that when people say one thing they do not mean 
something else.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:24 (7th ed. 2008) (internal footnotes omitted). Despite its informal 
roots, expressio unius is still widely used by judges when faced with ambiguity. Id. 
 92. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403(c)–(d) (2012). It is also worth noting that the exceptions to liability 
listed in the RFPA are relatively broad. For a list of specific exceptions, see supra note 35 and 
accompanying text. In addition to these specific exemptions, the RFPA also provides an exemption for 
liability when a financial institution discloses any financial records that are not identified or identifiable 
as being derived from the financial records of a particular customer. See 12 U.S.C. § 3413(a) (2012). 
Section 3417, which lists the circumstances under which a customer may sue for disclosure, further 
shields financial institutions by allowing a good-faith defense that states financial institutions cannot be 
held liable when they rely on faulty government certificates in good faith. See id. § 3417(c). The fact 
that there are so many exceptions to holding a bank liable suggests that Congress intended that similar 
behaviors not listed in an exception should be dealt with harshly. Thus, as a matter of policy, the lax 
standard of liability the RFPA places on banks should be balanced with a broader reading of “access” in 
order to be able to truly “strike a balance between customers’ right of privacy” and the needs of law 
enforcement to investigate criminal behavior. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978), as reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305.  
 93. However, this canon is only used when the intent of the statute is not apparent on its face. 
United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513, 519 (1912) (“The maxim invoked expresses a rule of construction, 
not of substantive law, and serves only as an aid in discovering the legislative intent when that is not 
otherwise manifest.”). The argument presented in this Note is that the RFPA’s intent is clear on its face. 
However, to the extent that it is not clear (as evidenced by the dismissal by the Brackfield court), this 
canon shows that in resolving a perceived ambiguity, the result should be the same: publishing a 
customer’s record is not allowed by the statute.  
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Requiring Government Obtainment 
Under the presumption that the government has access to a customer’s 
published financial information because the public record is indiscriminate 
in who can access it, the remaining question is whether the RFPA 
anticipated such access, and thus whether a customer can pursue statutory 
damages under the RFPA.94 As mentioned earlier, there are few cases 
interpreting the exact meaning of what aggrieved customers must show to 
establish standing to sue for an alleged RFPA violation.95 The protection of 
a customer’s information is twofold: the RFPA prevents the bank from 
releasing that information and it prevents the government from obtaining 
the information.96 So, it follows that to sue under each of the sections, the 
court would require a different showing of proof: that either the bank 
released the information or the government obtained it.97 According to 
Brackfield, however, for an individual to establish standing for an RFPA 
claim against a bank (via § 3403) for putting the individual’s information in 
the public record, “[p]laintiffs need only establish that their information was 
obtained by the Government.”98 This sentence was central to the court’s 
decision to dismiss Brackfield.99 The court’s assertion, however, misapplies 
the RFPA. 
1. Amidax: A Case Involving Government Obtainment 
To understand why this sentence is misguided in the context of the 
Brackfield case, it is helpful to consider a case in which it is aptly used. A 
nearly identical statement to the one in Brackfield appears in a 2009 decision 
by the Southern District of New York when it was faced with deciding what 
a customer must prove to sue for an RFPA violation in a slightly different 
context.100 There, the court stated that to establish standing, a “plaintiff need 
 
 
 94. See discussion infra Part IV.  
 95. See Brackfield Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 1–2.  
 96. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012), with id. § 3403. See also discussion infra Part III-C(2).  
 97. The wording of the RFPA’s § 3417, entitled “Civil penalties,” supports the notion that there 
can be an action against either the financial institution or the government: “Any agency or department 
of the United States or financial institution obtaining or disclosing financial records . . . is liable to the 
customer . . . .” 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the preferred 
interpretation of “or” as a disjunctive term, see discussion supra Part II.  
 98. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015). 
 99. See id. (“The problem for Plaintiffs is that taken in its totality, their Complaint does not allege 
that any of their financial information was disclosed to the Government. To establish [standing], 
Plaintiffs need only establish that their information was obtained by the Government.”). 
 100. See Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL (Amidax I), 607 F. Supp. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 
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only establish that its information was obtained by the government.”101 In 
that case, Amidax Trading Group (Amidax) sued SWIFT, their financial 
institution, and the government, for (among other things) violating the 
RFPA by unlawfully providing the U.S. Treasury Department with 
Amidax’s financial information.102 The Treasury Department “issued a 
‘narrowly targeted subpoena’ to SWIFT, seeking only records of individuals 
‘tied to terrorism.’”103 Amidax alleged that SWIFT did not comply with the 
constraints of the subpoena, and instead handed over their entire database 
of customer information.104 Amidax’s only proof of this claim, however, 
was one anonymous source from a New York Times article, which stated 
that the entire database had been handed over, and a statement by the 
Treasury Secretary that stated that SWIFT had offered “to give them all the 
data.”105 Contradictory evidence presented (including facts from the same 
New York Times article from which the quote was pulled) showed that 
“SWIFT made clear that it could provide data only in response to a valid 
subpoena and insisted that the data be used only for terrorism 
investigations.”106 Thus, Amidax’s RFPA claim was dismissed for lack of 
standing when Amidax was unable to show that their specific information 
was among the records handed over to the government.107 
In this case, the financial institution provided both access to and 
provision of some customer information to the government. The customers, 
therefore, could have established standing only by showing that their 
information was among the records obtained by the government.108 In other 
words, the government’s obtainment of the customer information implies 
that it had access, for it could not have obtained the information without 
first having access to it. Thus, the requirement that the customer “need only 
 
 
2009), aff’d, 671 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 101. Id. at 508.  
 102. Id. at 502–03.  
 103. Id. at 502 (quoting language from the complaint).  
 104. Id. at 503.  
 105. Id. at 506; see also Amidax Trading Grp. v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL (Amidax II), 671 F.3d 140, 147–
48 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 106. Amidax II, 671 F.3d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amidax proffered that SWIFT 
had given its entire database of customer information to the government but offered only a quote from 
an anonymous source published by the New York Times as evidence of its claim. Id. at 146. Because 
only one anonymous source of the nearly twenty sources interviewed stated that SWIFT had handed 
over the entire database, the court concluded that “Amidax's allegation that SWIFT's entire database was 
handed over to the government [was] speculative and conjectural and thus insufficient to establish a 
basis for Amidax's standing to sue.” Id. 
 107. Id. at 147–48.  
 108. Amidax I, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (stating that the injury-in-fact test “requires that the party 
seeking review be himself among the injured”) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 
(1972)).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1074 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1057 
 
 
 
 
establish that their information was obtained by the Government”109 to 
establish standing should only apply in this context, i.e., when obtainment 
is at issue. 
Unlike the situation in Amidax, the customer in Brackfield was not suing 
under a claim of relief stemming from the government unlawfully obtaining 
their financial information. Instead, the customer claimed that the bank 
unlawfully provided the government with access to that information.110 In 
Amidax, access to the information was immaterial because access to and 
obtainment of the information happened simultaneously. Thus, it was 
logically sound for the court to require the plaintiff to show that the 
government had obtained their information. However, in Brackfield, access 
was not immaterial to resolving the controversy—it was the central issue.111 
The government, as a member of the entire world that has free and open 
access to the information in public records, currently has access to the 
Brackfield customer’s information. It has not, however, necessarily 
obtained that information. Thus, in stating that the customer needs to show 
that their information was obtained by the government in order to sue, the 
Brackfield court incorrectly conflated two distinct RFPA violations: (1) a 
financial institution granting access to that information,112 and (2) the 
government obtaining the information.113 The court should have addressed 
the plaintiff’s standing in the context of the financial institution improperly 
providing the government with access, instead of addressing the collateral 
issue of whether the government had obtained such information. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the reason the Amidax court dismissed the 
case was not because the government never reviewed the customer’s files,114 
but only because Amidax “failed to affirmatively aver that there was an 
actual provision of access to, copies of, or information contained in 
financial records to a Government authority.”115 The same court that 
decided Amidax confirmed this interpretation of the decision after the 
Brackfield memoranda were filed: “[In Amidax], we viewed the collection 
 
 
 109. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015); see also Amidax I, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 504. 
 110. See Brackfield Complaint, supra note 70, at ¶ 37.  
 111. See Brackfield Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 5–8. See also Brackfield, 
2015 WL 5177737, at *3. 
 112. See 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012).  
 113. See id. § 3403.  
 114. This was the interpretation set forth by the bank in its memorandum in support of its Motion 
to Dismiss in the Brackfield case. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 5–6, 
Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 WL 
5177737 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015).  
 115. Brackfield Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 87, at 9 (emphasis added).  
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of the data in question, if it had in fact occurred, as an injury sufficient to 
confer standing, without considering whether such data were likely to be 
reviewed.”116 Thus, even the case that the bank relied on as persuasive 
authority in the Brackfield controversy recognized that actual review of the 
information is less important to the inquiry into an RFPA violation than 
obtainment. 
2. The Structure of The Right to Financial Privacy Act: Protection 
from Disclosure and Obtainment 
The RFPA’s statutory scheme lends credence to the interpretation that, 
by granting a government authority access to a customer’s financial 
information (be it the primary intent or an unanticipated consequence), a 
bank violates the RFPA. The RFPA grants customers a cause of action 
against either, or both, of two entities that violate the statute: a financial 
institution and a government authority.117 This separation of entities against 
which claims can be brought protects customer information in two ways: 
allowing aggrieved customers whose financial information has been 
improperly disclosed a right of action against (1) the governmental authority 
that obtained the records, and (2) the financial institution that disclosed 
them.118 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out the different 
functions of these sections and concluded that, when it enacted the RFPA, 
“Congress limited both the disclosure of customer records by financial 
institutions and the acquisition of such information by governmental 
entities. It did so by enacting two ‘companion’ sections, one directed at the 
actions of governmental entities, and the other directed at the actions of 
financial institutions.”119 If, as the Brackfield court held, the RFPA only 
contemplated situations in which a financial institution directly and 
intentionally provides access to a government authority,120 there would 
never be an instance in which an aggrieved customer would sue one entity 
and not the other, rendering the separation of the two actions 
inconsequential. In light of the statute’s stated goal of providing customers 
 
 
 116. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 802 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 117. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (prohibiting access to financial records by government authorities), 
with id. § 3403 (prohibiting financial institutions from providing “access to or copies of, or the 
information contained in, the financial records of” customers).  
 118. See supra note 59.  
 119. Tucker v. Waddell, 83 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).  
 120. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015) (“[The bank] argues that since it did not disclose the 
Plaintiffs’ information directly to a ‘Government authority,’ the Plaintiffs have no claim under the 
RFPA. The Court agrees.”). 
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a right to privacy of their financial information, except when obtained 
pursuant to “legitimate investigations” by law enforcement,121 perhaps a 
more reasonable interpretation would be to read the statute as keeping 
financial information from being both disclosed and obtained.122 The 
separation of each entity’s obligations under the statute supports the 
interpretation that financial institutions have duties to their customers that 
are broader than the duty not to directly hand over customer information to 
government authorities.123  
Additionally, § 3403, titled “Confidentiality of financial records,” states 
that “[a] financial institution shall not release the financial records of a 
customer until the Government authority seeking such records certifies in 
writing to the financial institution that it has complied with the applicable 
provisions of this chapter.”124 Of two possible interpretations, one is 
eventually contradicted in the RFPA, and should not be considered valid.125 
A more natural interpretation suggests that the bank has an independent duty 
to safeguard customer financial information until supplied with written 
notification of RFPA compliance. The Tenth Circuit interpreted the RFPA 
in the same manner, stating: “The RFPA prohibits the release of ‘financial 
records’ unless set procedures are followed.”126  
 
 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 33 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305 (stating 
the RFPA’s goal as “strik[ing] a balance between customers’ right of privacy and the need of law 
enforcement agencies to obtain financial records pursuant to legitimate investigations”).  
 122. See Tucker, 83 F.3d at 692. This court used the existence of the RFPA’s companion sections 
(liability of both the government and the financial institution) to show that, in the context of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, a statute modeled after the RFPA, the absence of one 
of the “companion” sections (specifically, a § 3402 analog) “indicates that Congress did not intend to 
authorize civil suits against governmental entities for improperly obtaining customer records.” Id.  
 123. Before the Brackfield decision, the Sixth Circuit framed the RFPA as “impos[ing] an 
affirmative duty on the government and banking officials to safeguard the financial records of 
individuals utilizing the services of banks.” In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th 
Cir. 1983). This duty is violated in two instances: disclosure and obtainment of customer information 
(outside the confines of legal process). Id.  
 124. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(b) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 125. One could interpret the phrase “until the Government authority seeking such records” as 
implying that this section only applies when a government authority has already begun actively seeking 
a customer’s records. However, the RFPA goes on to state: 
Nothing in this chapter shall preclude a financial institution, as an incident to perfecting a 
security interest . . . , from providing copies of any financial record to any court or Government 
authority. Id. § 3403(d)(1).  
In the situation this exception describes, bank-to-government communication is not required and, even 
when such intervention is necessary (i.e., when the government guarantees part of the loan), it is listed 
as a separate exception. See id. § 3403(d)(2). 
 Thus, as discussed in Part III-B, the canon expressio unius would render the Brackfield scenario of 
a bank releasing a customer’s information not in pursuance of “perfecting a security interest” as 
intentionally omitted and thus, prohibited from being released. 
 126. Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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Finally, the RFPA’s § 3412 provision regarding interagency transfers 
within the government sheds some light on the scope of privacy its writers 
had in mind.127 “This section provides that information obtained under the 
title may not be used or retained for any purpose other than the specific 
statutory purpose for which the information was originally obtained, and 
that the information may not be transferred to another government agency 
without specific statutory authorization.”128 Thus, once the government 
does obtain the information, it is prohibited not only from sharing such 
information among other branches, but the information’s use is limited even 
within the original agency. The customer protection provided by this 
provision shows the wide scope of protection that Congress intended to 
confer to customers of financial institutions. This protective measure would 
be entirely thwarted if the information were made public, granting any 
person or agency of the government access, without the need to abide by 
any legal process. 
D. Policy Considerations in Reading The Right to Financial Privacy Act 
The text of the RFPA, read plainly or through the use of canons; the 
judicial interpretation of similar statutes; and the general acceptance of 
statutory injuries as sufficient for standing, work together to support a 
finding that public disclosure of a customer’s information is a violation of 
the RFPA. The intent of the representatives behind the act, as is visible in 
the RFPA’s structure and its legislative history, further supports this notion. 
Finally, public policy considerations reinforce the idea that a bank should 
not be able to bypass the customer protections put in place by the RFPA 
simply by publishing the information at large.  
Interpreting the RFPA as allowing a financial institution to publish 
customer information, so long as there is no direct contact between a bank 
and the government, would undermine the RFPA’s purpose of providing 
individuals with privacy in their financial records.129 The Eleventh Circuit 
case Lopez v. First Union Nat'l Bank considered whether a financial 
institution could disclose customer information to law enforcement officers 
if they suspected “any possible violation of the law,” pursuant to the “safe 
harbor provisions” of the Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act.130 
 
 
 127. 12 U.S.C. § 3412(a). See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.  
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 35 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9307.  
 129. Lopez v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 129 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[Miller] prompted 
Congress to enact the [RFPA], which provides individuals with some privacy rights in financial records 
that are in the hands of third parties.”) (citations omitted).  
 130. Id. at 1191 (examining 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (1992)).  
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The court decided that for the provision to apply, there must be a good-faith 
basis for the connection between suspected illegal activity and the accounts 
from which information is disclosed: 
If it were otherwise, a bank would have free license to disclose 
information from any and every account in the entire bank once it 
suspected illegal activity in any account at the bank. We do not think 
Congress intended such a drastic result which would needlessly strip 
away any right or expectation of privacy in financial records and 
effectively undo virtually all of what Congress did when it enacted 
the Right to Financial Privacy Act . . . .131 
The court’s concern that, by the defendant’s proposed reading of the statute, 
a financial institution could disclose the financial information of customers 
who were not suspected of illegal activities mirrors the concerns arising 
from Brackfield. If a financial institution’s disclosure of customer 
information to the public as a whole is outside the protection of the RFPA, 
so long as there was no direct communication with a government authority, 
then it would allow financial institutions to publicize every customer’s 
information—in effect allowing every government authority unbridled 
access to every customer’s information. This result would certainly 
“needlessly strip away any right or expectation of privacy,”132 and 
undermine the RFPA’s purpose entirely.  
Another court explained, “[t]he basic thrust of the [RFPA] is that 
customers of financial institutions are entitled to notice of any government 
request for their financial records and an opportunity to challenge the 
request.”133 By this understanding, the statute would have no purpose in 
cases where the bank’s actions were not deemed an RFPA violation. Once 
the information is released into the public record, financial institutions 
would not receive requests for the information by the government and 
would be thereby unable to provide its customers with notice. In the end, 
this result would undercut the purpose of the RFPA by stripping away the 
customer’s ability to challenge the request before the government has 
obtained the information. 
Had the bank in Brackfield been securing a legitimate interest in the 
customer’s property, their actions would be protected by the RFPA.134 In 
reality, the bank provided the government access to customer financial 
 
 
 131. Id. at 1195–96.  
 132. Id. at 1195.  
 133. Hunt v. SEC, 520 F. Supp. 580, 601 (N.D. Tex. 1981).  
 134. See supra text accompanying note 46 
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information without the protections of the above exception, nor any other 
exception (such as assisting in a legitimate investigation). Acceptance of the 
Brackfield decision would render the RFPA toothless and stunt its ability to 
accomplish its stated goal of balancing customer privacy with allowing 
legitimate government investigations into customers’ records.135 
IV. STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AS INJURIES-IN-FACT 
Even if a court is persuaded by the proposal that a bank violates the 
RFPA by granting the government access to a customer’s information, the 
customer faces another hurdle in protecting his financial privacy: the issue 
of standing. The answer to whether a customer can sue his bank for an RFPA 
violation after it publishes his information depends on whether the statutory 
damages are recognized as sufficient for Article III standing.136 For a 
plaintiff to have standing, he must prove that he has suffered a concrete and 
particularized “injury in fact,” which is actual or imminent (as opposed to 
conjectural or hypothetical); that his injury is fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s actions; and, finally, that it is likely that a favorable decision by 
the court will redress his injury.137 In addition to these requirements, “there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 
of.”138 
A. The Right to Financial Privacy Act’s Statutory Damages Provision 
In Brackfield, the conduct “complained of” is that the bank violated the 
RFPA by improperly providing government authorities with access to the 
customer’s financial information.139 However, the injuries alleged (e.g., 
tarnished credit score and lost value to their property) flow from private 
parties having access to the customer’s information, not from the 
 
 
 135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.  
 136. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the power of the courts to deciding cases or 
controversies). This limitation has been interpreted as requiring that “the plaintiff himself has suffered 
some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action” before the case can properly 
come before a federal court. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (quotations and citations 
omitted). “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide 
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Id. at 498.  
 137. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). 
 138. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
  
 139. See Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *3. 
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government having access to it.140 Thus, the very basis of the RFPA claim 
did not result in these injuries, and the customer did not even allege that 
they did.141 The Brackfield court agreed with the bank in concluding that the 
customer cannot claim an actual injury from the publication of his 
information, and dismissed the case with prejudice.142 The court, however, 
failed to address that actual damages are but one of the four types of 
recovery available for an RFPA violation.143 
The RFPA provides:  
[A]ny…financial institution obtaining or disclosing financial records 
. . . in violation of this chapter is liable to the customer . . . in an 
amount equal to the sum of—(1) $100 without regard to the volume 
of records involved; (2) any actual damages sustained by the 
customer as a result of the disclosure; (3) such punitive damages as 
the court may allow, where the violation is found to have been willful 
or intentional; and (4) in the case of any successful action to enforce 
liability under this section, the costs of the action together with 
reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.144  
Thus, a customer lacking actual damages from the disclosure does not end 
the inquiry of whether he has standing, as § 3417(a)(1) awards damages for 
a statutory injury as well.145 
There has been recent disagreement about whether a statutory injury, 
occurring when a person’s statutory rights have been violated, will suffice 
as an injury-in-fact necessary for standing in order to sue for the 
corresponding statutory damages.146 There are several federal statutes 
 
 
 140. See id. The court acknowledged that “[t]hese damages may have a causal connection to the 
breach of contract claim, but they do not flow from a RFPA violation.” Id. The court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the contract claim and dismissed it without prejudice, allowing the 
customer to pursue it in state court. Id. at *4. 
 141. See Brackfield Complaint, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 96–99 (listing the injuries resulting from private 
parties accessing the financial information).  
 142. Brackfield, 2015 WL 5177737, at *3.  
 143. See 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012). The Brackfield plaintiffs claimed all four types of damages in 
their complaint. Brackfield Complaint, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 85–88; 92–93.  
 144. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012).  
 145. Although the $100 award may appear to be de minimus, this Note assumes such concerns are 
secondary in the effort to explore the actual rights, duties, and obligations of the parties to the litigation 
without giving the issues short shrift. Additionally, if BB&T has a habit of publishing customer 
information in this way, a successful class action suit (and the corresponding legal fees) could raise the 
damages to an amount much greater than the seemingly de minimus $100 sought here.  
 146. See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 377–74 (1982) (allowing statutory 
injury as sufficient for standing in the context of the Fair Housing Act); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989) (allowing statutory injury as sufficient for standing in the context 
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Freedom of Information Act). But see Spokeo, Inc. v. 
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granting plaintiffs damages in an amount, range, or floor set by the statute 
itself.147 However, courts have disagreed on whether a statutory damages 
provision means that mere violation of the statute is sufficient to confer 
Article III standing,148 or whether it is simply a tool for encouraging lawsuits 
in cases where the actual damages would otherwise be too small to justify a 
suit or require quantifying damages that are difficult to compute.149 Some 
of this confusion comes from the apparent contradiction between circuits 
allowing claims for statutory injuries and the Article III requirement that 
plaintiffs have an actual injury.150 For the Brackfield court, the issue of 
whether a plaintiff claiming a statutory damage award for an RFPA 
violation, without proving actual damages flowing from the violation, was 
one of first impression.151 Ultimately, the court decided that since the 
customers could not claim an actual injury under the RFPA, their RFPA 
claim must be dismissed.152 The two circuits that addressed the issue head-
on, however, decided that the $100 statutory fine applies regardless of 
whether the customer incurred actual damages.153 Although the Brackfield 
 
 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (“[The plaintiff] cannot satisfy the demands of Article III by 
alleging a bare procedural violation. A violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may 
result in no harm.”).  
 147. “For willful failures to comply [with the Act], plaintiffs may see statutory damages between 
$100 and $1,000.” Geoffrey S. Stewart & Miriam S. Weiler, Emerging Issues in Statutory Damages, 
JONES DAY (July 2011), http://www.jonesday.com/emerging_issues_in_statutory_damages/#_ftnref2 
[https://perma.cc/3DJM-2SD6] (explaining The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 
U.S.C. § 1681n(a)). “For violations of the Act[] . . . plaintiffs are entitled to as much as $1,000 per 
violation.” Id. (explaining The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)). “For 
a lender’s failure to disclose credit terms, consumers are entitled to statutory damages of twice the 
lender’s finance charges, between $100 and $5,000 . . . .” Id. (explaining The Truth in Lending Act of 
1968, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A)).  
 148. See e.g., Edwards v. First Am. Corp., 610 F.3d 514, 518 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that a plaintiff 
suing for a violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act had standing to sue even though there 
was no actual injury). 
 149. See e.g., Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935) (stating that statutory damages 
give the plaintiff “some recompense for injury due to him, in a case where the rules of law render difficult 
or impossible proof of damages . . .”); Forman v. Data Transfer, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 400, 404 (E.D. Pa. 
1995) (noting that statutory damages under the TCPA provide adequate incentive for individuals to bring 
suit).  
 150. See, e.g., Edwards, 610 F.3d at 517 (stating that the violation of a statutory right is usually a 
sufficient injury to confer standing). But see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (limiting the power of the 
courts to deciding cases or controversies); supra text accompanying note 136.  
 151. See Brackfield Brief for Appellants, supra note 14, at 1–2.  
 152. Brackfield & Assocs. P’ship v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., No. 3:14-cv-524-PLR-HBG, 2015 
WL 5177737, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 4, 2015), aff’d, 645 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 153. See Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We need not 
consider whether plaintiffs suffered any damages as a result of the disclosure. If the government or a 
financial institution violates the RFPA, the customer whose financial records were disclosed is entitled 
to $100, regardless of the volume of records involved.”); Duncan v. Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (“If the government is found liable under the [RFPA], plaintiffs are entitled to $100 statutory 
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court was not bound by those interpretations, even its own circuit’s court of 
appeals has held that statutory damages suffice as injuries for standing in 
the context of similar statutes.154  
In analyzing Brackfield’s claim, the court could have naturally employed 
the standard for analyzing statutory damages previously set forth in the 
Sixth Circuit in the context of Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) 
violations.155 In Beaudry v. TeleCheck Services, the court explained: 
“Congress ‘has the power to create new legal rights, [including] right[s] of 
action whose only injury-in-fact involves the violation of that statutory 
right.’”156 This power is limited by two characteristics plaintiffs are required 
to have in order to sue. First, the plaintiff must be “among the injured” in 
that his statutory rights were violated.157 Second, a violation of a right 
created by Congress “must cause individual, rather than collective, 
harm.”158 The first requirement is met in Brackfield because the government 
was given access to the records of the plaintiffs, which places them 
sufficiently “among the injured.” And because the statute in question does 
 
 
damages regardless of whether they prove actual damages.”).  
 154. The Brackfield district court is within the Sixth Circuit, which had not interpreted the RFPA 
specifically, though it had interpreted similar statutes. Thus, the Brackfield court was free to interpret 
the RFPA as it saw fit. However, this Note goes on to argue that it should have given more precedential 
weight to how the higher court interpreted statutes with similar schemes. See, e.g., Beaudry v. TeleCheck 
Servs., Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 703 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that a claimant may seek statutory damages for 
a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act without proof of actual damages); Fed. Home Loan Mortg. 
Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] consumer may recover statutory damages if the 
debt collector violates the [Fair Debt Collection Protection Act] even if the consumer suffered no actual 
damages.”); Purtle v. Eldridge Auto Sales, Inc., 91 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
consumer need not show that she “suffered actual monetary damages” to prevail on a Truth in Lending 
Act claim for statutory damages and attorney's fees). In addition to these cases, the same court that 
decided Brackfield, in a case involving the FDCPA, held that “whether [a] plaintiff is entitled to statutory 
or actual damages are two separate inquiries.” Hoffman v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship., No. 3:08-cv-255, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139509, at *49 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2010).  
 In affirming the Brackfield district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit stated that Brackfield had not 
“plausibly alleged an invasion of his statutory rights under the RFPA.” Brackfield, 645 F. App’x 428, 
431 (6th Cir. 2016). However, its analysis is flawed in much the same way as that of the district court. 
It does not distinguish between the distinct disclosure and obtainment prohibitions of the RFPA, 
discussed supra Part III.C. It additionally relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in S.E.C. v. Jerry 
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745 (1984) that “[t]he most salient feature of the [RFPA] is the narrow 
scope of the entitlement it creates.” Id. However, the Sixth Circuit decontextualizes the statement’s 
meaning in its reliance on it. At issue in S.E.C. was the RFPA’s requirement that banks notify customers 
whose information has been subpoenaed, and the Court goes on to emphasize the RFPA’s narrowness 
in the context of the SEC and citizens seeking to challenge its administrative subpoenas. See S.E.C. v. 
Jerry O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 745–47 (1984). 
 155. See, e.g., Beaudry, 579 F.3d 702.  
 156. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 707 (quoting In re Carter, 553 F.3d 979, 988 (6th Cir. 2009)).  
 157. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).  
 158. Id. (quoting In re Carter, 553 F.3d at 989).  
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not “‘authorize suits by members of the public at large,’”159 the second 
requirement is met, as in Beaudry. The statute instead authorizes only suits 
by “the customer to whom such records relate.”160 Thus, by the standard set 
forth in Beaudry, the customer in Brackfield meets the requirements for 
standing to sue by showing injury-in-fact through applicability of the 
statutory damages provision. 
However, an important distinction between the FCRA, discussed in 
Beaudry, and the RFPA, at issue in Brackfield, is the wording of the statutes’ 
provisions for statutory damages. Central to the court’s reasoning in 
Beaudry was the difference in damages available for willful violations 
(actual, punitive, and statutory) as compared to negligent violations (actual 
only).161 The Sixth Circuit used the differing treatment to quell fears of 
creating a “strict-liability regime” by reading the law to allow statutory 
damages without injury.162 Unlike the FRCA, the RFPA does not prescribe 
statutory damages based on culpability; only punitive damages depend on 
the intent of the violator.163 Because of this conflation of negligence and 
intentional violations, the court may have been wary of creating the “strict-
liability regime” that the Sixth Circuit was careful to avoid in Beaudry. 
However, the two Circuits admitting the RFPA’s statutory damages 
regardless of actual damages did not express concern about creating such a 
regime.164 In any case, these concerns should be greatly diminished by the 
RFPA’s “good-faith defense” provision, which states that any financial 
institution making disclosures in good-faith reliance on government 
certificates shall not be held liable.165 Thus, liability under the RFPA is 
limited to only those financial institutions that voluntarily provide the 
government with access to customer information, as seen in Brackfield. 
Given the RFPA’s text, statutory scheme, treatment by other courts and 
policy goals, the Brackfield customer’s suit should not have been dismissed 
for lack of standing. An unpublished opinion from the Northern District of 
Illinois analyzed an RFPA standing challenge this way: “It is well settled 
 
 
 159. Id.  
 160. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012).  
 161. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2012) (prescribing a floor of $100 and ceiling of $1,000, or, 
when a consumer report is obtained using false pretenses, the greater of actual damages and $1,000, 
punitive damages, and attorney’s fees for willful noncompliance with the statute), with id. § 1681o(a) 
(prescribing actual damages and attorney’s fees for negligent noncompliance with the statute).  
 162. Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 708 (“The existence of a willfulness requirement proves that there is 
nothing ‘strict’ about the state of behavior required to violate the law.”).  
 163. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a) (2012).  
 164. See Anderson v. La Junta State Bank, 115 F.3d 756, 759 (10th Cir. 1997); Duncan v. Belcher, 
813 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1987).  
 165. 12 U.S.C. § 3417(c) (2012).  
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that a statute itself may create a legal right, the invasion of which causes an 
injury sufficient to create standing.”166 Specifically, the court reasoned that 
“[t]he RFPA creates for private citizens a right to sue and recover actual or 
statutory damages for violations; the statute thus by its own terms creates a 
legally-protected interest.”167 Had the Brackfield court followed a similar 
line of reasoning, the case would not have been dismissed for lack of 
standing. Given the precedential weight of Beaudry and the clarity with 
which it sets out a method to address the viability of statutory damages as 
injuries-in-fact, denying the dismissal would have been a legally sound 
result.  
B. Spokeo: Complicating the Inquiry of Statutory Injuries 
Despite the common-sense interpretation of the RFPA set forth up to this 
point, the privacy protections provided by the RFPA are under siege from 
another angle which threatens to render the RFPA (and other statutes aimed 
to protect against the third-party-doctrine-shaped hole created by Miller) all 
but useless. In May 2016, the Supreme Court decided Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins.168 Although the decision was about the alleged violation of an 
FCRA provision, it provides guidance in cases such as Brackfield in which 
a different statute is used but the harm is of a general nature, such as the 
dissemination of information.  
The plaintiff in the underlying case was a man claiming that the website 
Spokeo.com published inaccurate information about him online.169 
Publishing false information about a person can be a violation of the FRCA 
requirement that companies “follow reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual 
about whom [it] relates.”170 Strangely, in this instance, the inaccuracies 
manifested in Spokeo listed him as more wealthy and educated than he 
actually was.171 Robins claimed that the actual injuries resulting from the 
misinformation included harm to his employment prospects, prolonged 
unemployment, and anxiety about his diminished employment prospects.172 
 
 
 166. Beam v. Mukasey, No. 07 C 1227, 2008 WL 4614324, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2008) (citing 
Ramirez v. Midwest Airlines, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166 (D. Kan. 2008)).  
 167. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 3417(a)).  
 168. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  
 169. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 2014), cert granted , 135 S. Ct. 1892 
(2015).  
 170. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012).  
 171. Spokeo, 742 F.3d at 411.  
 172. Id.  
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The Ninth Circuit noted that his allegations of injury were sparse,173 but 
after employing the Beaudry factors, ultimately decided that the violation 
of Robins’s statutory rights was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement for standing.174 
On April 27, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the 
issue of “[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a 
plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm . . . by authorizing a private right of 
action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.”175 Commentator Amy 
Howe listed three possible outcomes:176 First, and most unlikely, the Court 
could have found that a plaintiff need only allege a statutory violation, 
without pointing to a concrete harm.177 Second, the Court could have 
decided that there can only be standing when a plaintiff shows a violation 
of the statute and “real world” harm arising from that violation.178 Third, the 
Court could have found that Spokeo’s publication of incorrect information 
about Robins actually was an injury-in-fact.179  
The third outcome would have allowed the Court to update the law by 
recognizing a new type of injury. In a critique of the legacy of Prosser’s 
influential article on privacy law,180 Professors Neil Richards and Daniel 
Solove have urged lawmakers to adapt the law to modern times by coming 
to a more sophisticated conception of harm—one that recognizes “harms of 
a more intangible nature,” such as “harms to one’s psyche and emotions.”181 
Unfortunately, the eight-member Court rebuffed the opportunity to 
definitively decide the issue. The majority instead simply remanded the case 
back to the Ninth Circuit for a more complete analysis of the injury—
expressly declining to take a position on whether the Ninth Circuit’s 
 
 
 173. Id. at 410.  
 174. Id. at 413–14.  
 175. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Defendant-Appellant at i, Spokeo, Inc. v. Thomas 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339).  
 176. Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Second time around no easier for Justices in standing case, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/11/argument-analysis-
second-time-around-no-easier-for-justices-in-standing-case/ [https://perma.cc/Q3ZB-7Q22].  
 177. Id. (“Ginsburg . . . suggest[ed] that it would be ‘very strange’ to have a rule in which ‘if we 
have some historic practice where damages are awarded to someone who has no out-of-pocket loss, if 
the common law says so, it’s okay, but if Congress says so, it’s not.’”) Howe mentions that, based on 
their questions during oral arguments, only Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsberg seemed 
open to this outcome. Id.  
 178. Id. (stating that the conservative Justices seemed most sympathetic to this view). “Justice 
Antonin Scalia, for example, posited that, under Robins’s interpretation, the failure of a credit reporting 
agency to provide a ‘1-800’ number (required by the FCRA) would allow anyone to sue, even if it didn’t 
affect them at all.” Id.  
 179. Id.  
 180. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).  
 181. Richards & Solove, supra note 49, at 1922.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1086 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1057 
 
 
 
 
ultimate conclusion, that Robins was injured by the FCRA violation, was 
correct.182 The decision did little work on clearing up the area of the law on 
whether a “real world” injury is required to bring an action based on a 
statutory violation and the case could wind up back in front of the Justices 
if they do not approve of the Ninth Circuit’s position on remand.  
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDED INTERPRETATION 
Although it would be a step in the right direction, even the most 
favorable outcome for Robins in the Spokeo case would not fully address 
the RFPA loophole allowed in Brackfield. As discussed in Part III–C, the 
court interpreted the statute to require a showing of government obtainment 
before a plaintiff can sue. Thus, in light of the RFPA’s organizational 
framework, legislative history, its interpretation by other district and circuit 
courts, and policy considerations in carrying out its intended purpose, 
illegitimately publishing a customer’s financial information in the public 
record should be interpreted as providing government authorities access to 
that information in violation of the RFPA. Perhaps much of this discussion 
seems painstakingly nitpicky to the point of being overly critical of the 
court’s decision in Brackfield. After all, BB&T’s publication of the 
customer’s information was most likely a clerical oversight, as opposed to 
an attempt to sneak past the RFPA’s protections by taking advantage of its 
slippery wording. As the saying goes, “never attribute to malice that which 
is adequately explained by stupidity.”183 So, examining the minutiae of the 
RFPA may seem like an exercise in futility since the situation of a bank 
publishing a customer’s information is such a rare occurrence. But that is 
precisely why it is important for the court to rule in favor of the customer 
under these facts. This result would be of little impact to banks and financial 
institutions because the act of publishing a customer’s information is likely 
not a regularly conducted business activity, as it serves no purpose to the 
bank.184 However, the urged result would have a meaningful impact for 
bank customers because they could rest assured that any sensitive 
 
 
 182. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (finding the Ninth Circuit’s standing 
analysis incomplete because, although it analyzed Robins’s injury for its particularity to him, it failed to 
address whether the alleged FCRA violation “entail[ed] a degree of risk sufficient to meet the 
concreteness requirement”).  
y on you. Have another lawyer: w United States Court ofvernment involvementPAank'en informatino y 
on you. Have another lawyer: w183. This aphorism is often called “Hanlon’s razor.” OXFORD 
TREASURY OF SAYINGS AND QUOTATIONS 294 (Susan Ratcliffe ed., 2011). 
 184. Publishing information in pursuit of a lien or other property interest is explicitly permissible 
under the RFPA. 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012).  
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information they give their bank would remain confidential unless it was 
being sought by the government via legal measures—they would even be 
able to contest the government access to their files before it was given.185 
Such a result would be more in line with the intent and purpose of the statute 
and is a more suitable interpretation of the RFPA.186 
Aside from achieving a legally sound result, upholding the customers’ 
challenge in Brackfield would have been a judicially expedient move. 
Privacy concerns today mirror the concerns in the 1970s187 that spurred 
lawmakers to pass privacy protections like the RFPA in the first place. 
Today, however, technology plays an even bigger role than was imaginable 
at the time of the RFPA’s passage. According to a report by the U.S. Census 
Bureau, as of 2013, 83.8% of U.S. households owned a computer and 74.4% 
of U.S. households had Internet access.188 Ideally, legislators would adapt 
older laws to better serve their purpose as technology advances. 
Unfortunately, however, lawmakers have been playing catch-up in 
regulating how individuals, corporations, and the government can use 
emerging technologies as a way to collect and store personal data.189 
Because of this disparity, rapidly changing technology, and slowly adapting 
laws, courts should err on the side of protecting individuals when faced with 
interpreting older laws in a new way. This is especially true for the 
Brackfield case where the law can be read to protect the individual’s 
information by a plain reading of the statute.190 
Even if the Sixth Circuit agrees with the interpretation that the RFPA 
prohibits banks from publishing customer information in the public record, 
and even if the Spokeo decision comes down in favor of the plaintiff, the 
protection of financial privacy remains insubstantial. The RFPA, though a 
 
 
 185. Id. § 3407 (detailing the letter the government must send to a customer whose records they are 
seeking and explaining the steps necessary for the customer to stop the records from being accessed via 
judicial subpoena).  
 186. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 6 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9278 
(“Access to individual bank records would be governed by the procedures provided by the title and 
would guarantee that the customer knows who is looking at his records.”); id. at 50, as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9322 (“Section [3403(b)] prohibits a financial institution from disclosing records unless 
the requirements of the title are met.”); id. at 218, as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9348 (“[The 
RFPA] prohibits [financial] institutions, and their officers, employees and agents, from providing access 
to customer records, or to information contained in them, except as permitted by the act.”).  
 187. See FURLETTI & SMITH, supra note 17, at 2.  
 188. THOM FILE & CAMILLE RYAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2013 2 (2014), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/ 
2014/acs/acs-28.pdf.  
 189. See Richards & Solove, supra note 49, at 1889 (“Today, the chorus of opinion is that the tort 
law of privacy has been ineffective, particularly in remedying the burgeoning collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal information in the Information Age.”) (footnote omitted). 
 190. See discussion supra Section III-B. 
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valiant attempt to patch the hole in Fourth Amendment protection left by 
Miller, is limited to protecting individuals or small partnerships from 
financial institutions and the federal government.191 The RFPA by no means 
represents the pinnacle of privacy laws; it does not protect the release of 
financial information from other entities or access to it from state 
government agents. The Supreme Court created the third-party doctrine in 
1967, and in order to comprehensively protect financial information in the 
hands of trusted third parties, the Court must reverse it. 
W. Faith McElroy 
 
 
 
 191. See 12 U.S.C. § 3401(4) (2012) (defining “person” as “an individual or a partnership of five or 
fewer individuals”).  
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